Nanjing Protocol II

The Second Nanjing Protocol to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was a bilateral executive agreement between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Building upon the closer relations achieved in the first protocol, it established a military alliance through binding and actionable interpretations of standing international agreements the two made or helped to make during the Second World War. The protocol was concluded between Minister of Foreign Affairs T.V. Soong and Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Roshchin at the National Great Hall on September 12th 1949.

Background

The Chinese Civil War was resumed on February 9th 1949, as the People's Liberation Army launched a surprise offensive against standing Republic of China forces from their holdings in the Northern Armistice Area. The PLA bested the Republic of China Armed Forces and the National Salvation Volunteer Army in battles for control of the cities of Yan'an, their former headquarters, as well as Siping in their Winter Offensive. Back-and-forth fighting occurred in Manchuria, with many cities being decimated in sieges, as they were captured and recaptured in the PLA's campaign of irregular and asymmetric warfare. By late August 1949, it became clear that the nation may be plunged into recession due to effects of the resumed Chinese Civil War. Morale was at an all-time low in the armed forces, who expected a swift defeat of the PLA, as well as the public at large. For fiscal solvency and political stability to be maintained, the war had to end in days or weeks, not months or years.

However, the U.S. was rapidly demobilizing around the world, especially in Asia. American personnel had long left China, and by June 1949, they were no longer participating in the defense of southern Korea outside of an advisory role. The only place where they had a sizable presence was in the occupation of Japan, a prior source of discontentment for China. Internal memos in the Chinese government asserted that the United States' limited involvement and aid even before the signing of the first Protocol had not been decisive in any phase of the Chinese Civil War, nor did it prevent the 1947 Chinese Revolution, and thus greater military cooperation with the Soviet Union instead could be more fruitful.

President Sun Fo himself had a previous working relationship with Stalin, engaging in direct talks with him from 1937 to 1939 in order to attain military supplies during the Second Sino-Japanese War after being turned down by all of the other Allied powers, with relatively few strings attached. Sun thus, despite past transgressions, trusted Stalin and the Soviet Union as a whole to help China more than the United States, the United Kingdom or France. However, it took months of fighting the insurgents alone despite repeated and unheard pleas to the others confirm this to him.

Provisions

Sino-Soviet alliance against Japan

The Nanjing Protocol II began by proclaiming continued support for Article I-II of the Sino-Soviet Treaty: “The High Contracting Parties undertake in association with the other United Nations to wage war against Japan until final victory is won. The High Contracting Parties undertake mutually to render to one another all necessary military and other assistance and support in this war. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan and not to conclude, without mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty either with the present Japanese Government or with any other government or authority set up in Japan which do not renounce all aggressive intentions”.

A list of grievances was then presented that made the friendly intentions of the “authority in Japan” questionable. These were first presented by Soviet and Chinese representatives in the Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission, only to be rebuffed by the United States.

1. The Potsdam Declaration stated in Point Seven that “points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied”, but Soviet and Chinese representatives in the Allied Council for Japan and the Far Eastern Commission were denied when they requested greater personnel in the main islands. The Protocol notes “General Douglas MacArthur is the ultimate authority in Japan as the so-called Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, but he was appointed unilaterally without sufficient consultation of the Republic of China nor the Soviet Union.”
2. Point Ten of Potsdam declared that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.” However, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East did not try members of Unit 731, nor did the occupational government do anything to acknowledge them. This was because, unstated in the Protocol, SCAP MacArthur had secretly provided them immunity to prosecution for access to their research on biological warfare.
3. Emperor Hirohito and the rest of the Imperial House of Japan were also not tried on war crimes charges, despite the fact that the Emperor at least was both the head of state and the commander-in-chief of the Imperial Army and Navy, and thus explicitly amenable to prosecution according to the third Nuremberg Principle enumerated by the United Nations' International Law Commission. Again, the SCAP had worked for their amnesty.
4. Point Ten also decreed that “The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.” Despite this, the SCAP ran a Civil Censorship Detachment (CDD) which censored media in occupied Japan.

The Protocol did not mention the United States by name in any of these points of criticism, instead laying the blame personally on General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. The USSR and the ROC “strongly urged” that General MacArthur resign his post, after which all five of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would unanimously approve a new SCAP. The unstated implication was that for failing to do this, the United States was culpable in protecting Japanese militants to further imperial interests against Asia.

Until a new SCAP could be appointed by the UNSC, or until the current one agreed to prosecute all war criminals, end “unnecessary censorship”, and permitted the other Allied Powers more than an advisory role, the Republic of China could not and would not be able to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. Absent these proposals, the “final victory” discussed in Article I of the Sino-Soviet Treaty had not yet been attained, nor was the surrender of Japan recognized as unconditional due to the failure to prosecute Emperor Hirohito.

Thus the hostilities recognized in the Chinese Declaration of War Against Japan on December 9th 1941 as well as the Soviet Declaration of War on Japan issued on August 9th 1945 continued. Consequently, the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty's military alliance between the two powers remained in full force, and would remain so until 1975, as provided in Article VIII. Furthermore, the treaty had stipulated for both powers “not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party”, now implicitly meaning the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or any like body formed by the United States.

Material aid and the lack of mutual defense

Pursuant to the Sino-Soviet Treaty and the understanding of it reached in Nanjing Protocol II, the Soviet Union agreed to give China credits for the purchase of top-of-the-line military equipment, including PPSh-41 machine guns, T-34 tanks, and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter aircraft. They would also use their pilots to help the ROC in military operations and for the training of their own air force. The Soviet Armed Forces were also granted permission to freely travel in the Northern Armistice Area on the condition that they respect civilians and actively assist in efforts to defeat the People's Liberation Army, but only if requested by the Republic of China.

Nonetheless, neither the treaty nor the protocol called for mutual defense or security as the North Treaty Treaty had for the Western European nations and the United States. Unless an attack was made by Japan, which had no standing armed forces, nothing bound the Soviet Union nor the Republic of China to come to others' aid should an attack. This freed China of entanglements in Europe and the Soviet Union from entanglements in Asia.

Aftermath

Consequences in the Chinese Civil War, surrender of the People's Liberation Army

The Republic of China and the Soviet Union issued a joint declaration for the immediate surrender of the People's Liberation Army on the same day that Nanjing Protocol II was concluded. Stalin advised the Chinese Communist Party to peacefully participate in a democratic coalition with the Kuomintang as he had for almost the entire duration of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. This caused a leadership crisis in the CCP, as Chairman Mao Zedong wished to continue irregular warfare against the ROC, and argued that even both powers could not completely defeat the PLA. However, Vice Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee Zhou Enlai disagreed vehemently, believing that such an approach would only lead to their annihilation.

Mao eventually relented, seeing the value of a strategic retreat as well as the rapidly waning political capital he had to press on with the war. The Military Commission officially surrendered to the Central Government of the Republic of China on behalf of the PLA on September 20th 1949. The Soviet Armed Forces then marched and airlifted hundreds of thousands of PLA soldiers and CCP officials to Lüda Military District. Others fled to the Mongolian People’s Republic, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Soviet Union proper. All of their military equipment remained intact except when it was captured directly by the Republic of China Armed Forces. This has sometimes been called the Second Long March, although it inspired little in terms of propaganda opportunities as the first had. Nonetheless, the threat of a Communist insurgency in Manchuria would remain an ace in the hole for the Soviet Union in its dealings with the Republic of China.   

Domestic and international reactions

President Sun Fo conducted a massive parade through Nanjing to celebrate the surrender of the PLA as well as China's “friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in our shared struggle against Japanese imperialism, and the global forces of reaction.” The Kuomintang reiterated this and portrayed the conduct of the Soviet Union during the Second Sino-Japanese War in an extremely positive light in its newsletter, highlighting the fact that it was the first of the Allied Powers to provide assistance, with some $250,000,000 in credits for war supplies and over 3000 military advisers and pilots.

However, the Chinese Youth Party (CYP) strongly opposed the agreement, and proposed a non-binding resolution in the Constituent Assembly to condemn human rights abuses and suppression of democracy in the Soviet Union, as well as past territorial incursions against China since the signing of the initial treaty in 1945. Party chairman of the CYP Zuo Shunsheng stated on the floor of the Constituent Assembly: “The Kuomintang has betrayed our longtime ally, the United States, and moreover, they have betrayed the Chinese people. We cannot collude with Communists, who are antithetical to the preservation of democratic governments wherever they're found.” As presiding officer of the assembly, President Sun did not bring this proposal to a vote.

Meanwhile, the last U.S. military advisers in China hastily departed after the PLA surrendered. The Truman administration wanted to portray this as a victory of its allies against Communism, and hoped to downplay the role of the Soviet Union as well as Protocol II itself. Thus President Harry S. Truman referred to the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War as “a triumph for all freedom-loving nations over the forces of totalitarianism. The defense of peace in the world remains indivisible.” In a report produced by the State Department, the United States suggested that its foreign aid, especially the China Aid Act of 1948, and its assistance in training the armed forces of the ROC were critical to the defeat of the Communists.

The State Department later issued a reply addressing the grievances raised within the Protocol, defending American conduct in its occupation of Japan as well as criticizing the Soviet Union and China for calling it into question. President Sun Fo responded that “the historic friendship between the American and Chinese peoples will never be forgotten by this government. But sometimes it is necessary to give unpleasant counsel to those we value the most because we value and respect them so.” He went onto say: “Japanese imperialism must be replaced with republicanism. To prevent another global war from ever happening again, the Mikado must go.” Despite China's “unpleasant counsel”, General MacArthur remained SCAP and none of the points raised in the second Protocol were acted upon by the United States nor the United Nations.

Effects on Japan, Soviet-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations

Shortly after the Korean Civil War, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution to create the United Nations Self-Defense Forces in Japan (UNSDFJ) on March 30th 1952. The rationale was that the Nanjing Protocols, in light of the events in Korea, suggested an existential threat to Japan by China and the Soviet Union until a peace treaty could be concluded between them. Douglas MacArthur served as the first Supreme Commander of the UNSDFJ. Forty-eight nations that participated in the Second World War against the Empire of Japan signed the Treaty of San Francisco to conclude hostilities and offer reparations in 1951. The Soviet Union or China despite participating in the talks to create it did not sign off on it, with standing complaints carried over from this Protocol.

The same year the Security and Cooperation Treaty Between the United States and Japan was concluded, and both went into effect in 1952, officially ending the United States Occupation of Japan. The title of Supreme Commander of the UNSDFJ was transferred to the Prime Minister of Japan in 1952, to emphasize civilian control of the military. The UNSDFJ remain the standing armed forces for Japan, and are unique in that they exist only with the consent of the United Nations General Assembly. Debates to reform this on the basis of national sovereignty remain a contentious topic in Japanese politics.

The Khrushchev Thaw saw the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1956 Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué. However, the concept of rapprochement with Japan remained politically unpopular in China, and thus no government sought to normalize relations for decades. However, during the 1975-6 Recession, it was thought that reparations from, and closer commercial relations with, Japan would help the ROC economically. At the same time, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and the Nanking Protocols were set to expire. The State of Japan and the Republic of China thus concluded the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty on September 19th 1975, formally ending the Second Sino-Japanese War and restoring diplomatic relations.